Strait to the Top: Securing the Northern Flank for Sino-American Conflict
By: Tony Stark
“I believe that in the future, whoever holds Alaska will hold the world. I think it is the most important strategic place in the world.” -Gen. Billy Mitchell, 1935
Some seven years prior to the Japanese invasion of the Aleutian Islands, father of the US Air Force, General Billy Mitchell testified to Congress on the importance of securing America’s Northern flank. “Whoever holds Alaska will hold the world” was a bold statement to make in an era of budget constraints and isolationism about a territory so neglected and misunderstood that it was barely mentioned in the US Rainbow war plans. Known as the “Forgotten Battle” of the Pacific War because it was overshadowed by the simultaneous Guadalcanal Campaign in the South Pacific, the Aleutian Islands campaign featured hellish conditions, poor planning, and sloppy execution while provoking fears of homeland invasion in both the Continental US and the Japanese Home Islands. Both sides saw the Aleutians as potential stepping stones to each other’s homelands, but neither succeeded in using the islands for such an approach. The Aleutian Islands campaign of 1942–43 demonstrates how little the Japanese and Americans understood about how to operate in sub-arctic conditions and how both underestimated the value of holding and fortifying the Aleutian Islands and Alaska.
The Arctic and near-Arctic regions have a barren history of combat operations. The earliest military histories are from explorers in the late 18th centuries. Unlike nearly every other potential battlefield in the world, commanders and planners are unable to lean on hundreds if not thousands of years of battles to inform them on how to conduct themselves in the Arctic like they are able to in Europe or the Middle East. The Alaskan theatre and other subarctic and arctic regions are nearly clean slates for combat operations. Therefore, studying and applying the lessons of the few major battles in the High North is critical to future operational success against revisionist states with ambitions in the region like Russia and China.
Once known as Seward’s Folly for the American Secretary of State who supposedly royally screwed up by purchasing the Northern frontier, Alaska was largely ignored by the Americans in their pre-war planning. Not that they did not see the northern territory as valuable, they simply did not see it as operationally relevant in a Pacific conflict with Imperial Japan. The Japanese were not as confident in Alaska’s irrelevance. The Japanese were so concerned about the US using the Aleutian Islands as a staging area for invasion of the Northern Home Islands that they demanded the Americans not construct any naval bases there as a part of the Washington Naval Treaty. That the US obliged underlines just how low the North Pacific was ranked on the list of strategic priorities. From the time of the Alaskan purchase in 1867 to the 1930s, there were several limited attempts at establishing military footholds in the Alaskan territory. Naturally, the prioritization of Mahanian strategic fueling stations across the Central Pacific and budget constraints meant that reconnaissance expeditions, basing surveys and construction, were rather limited in size and scope. Through the 1920s, the Army could afford little more than small platoon-sized outposts, something quite reminiscent of the US Army outposts littered across the Western frontier in the mid to late 19th century. The Navy could not spare more than a few small, older vessels to patrol the waters around Alaska, sending expeditions into the Aleutians largely to enforce fishing rights and survey potential deep-water ports. Through the 1930s, Japanese fishing boats intruded upon American waters repeatedly until the US Navy intervened. Just as the PLAN uses its maritime militia and fishing fleet to collect intelligence, the IJN used their fishermen to do the same in the run up to WWII.
Critical to understanding the security situation in the Eastern Pacific (from Hawaii to North America) is the concept of the “Alaska-Hawaii-Panama Canal” triangle. Control of all three secures freedom of maneuver in the Eastern Pacific and allows the US Navy to guard the Western Coast of the continental United States from invasion. Panama enables access to the Caribbean and the underbelly of the US in the Gulf of Mexico, as well as the rapid movement of forces between Atlantic and Pacific theatres. Controlling the Panama Canal means the US as a seafaring nation and naval power is united by water rather than divided by land. At the halfway point across the Pacific, the Hawaiian Islands provide Mahanian logistics centers (coaling stations in the days of Mahan) and deep-water ports for the American for naval and commercial vessels as well as a launch pad for operations in every direction. Alaska is an entirely different situation than Hawaii or Panama. The Aleutian Islands, the tail of Alaska extending southwest in the North Pacific, act as the gates to/from the Arctic as well as stepping stones to the American mainland along the “Great Circle Route” of the Pacific.
The weather around the Aleutian Islands is some of the harshest in the world. At the time of the campaign, the fighting season was restricted to the warmest spring and summer months. The islands, caught between the climates, winds, and currents of the Bering Sea and the Northern Pacific Ocean, were regularly plagued by storms and fog that made simply getting to the fight an extremely difficult endeavor. Moreover, even the ground composition of the island made construction of facilities difficult even in the best conditions. While decades of warming and climate change since have made conditions marginally better and the potentially longer, the sub-arctic conditions still require extra training and gear.
Until recently, the gateway to the Arctic was largely seen as a one-way trip to Hades. The Arctic had little commercial or naval importance relative to the rest of the world. Whereas Hawaii and Panama saw excellent weather year-round, the fighting season in Alaska was hellishly brutal and short and transit through the Arctic was virtually nonexistent. The storms and temperatures made fighting around the Aleutians limited to the warmest summer months. This also meant limited flight windows, resupply, and increased risk to ships in port and at sea. In addition to the strategic complications of massing and deploying troops to invade the Japanese Home Islands while leaving the South and Central Pacific untouched, the weather made the use of the Aleutians by the Americans suboptimal. Thus, Alaska was the weak and mostly forgotten leg of the Alaska-Hawaii-Panama triangle that so much of US strategic planning focused around in the inter-war years. Once the war broke out, that all changed as the US began to mass tens of thousands of troops in the territory.
Historians still disagree as to whether the Aleutian Islands campaign was an attempt to draw out the American fleet at Midway or to shore up the Home Islands Northern flank. Whether the Japanese intended to protect their flank, divert US forces at Midway, or a combination of both, the resulting campaign cost blood, resources, and treasure with no result other than retreat. The subsequent buildup of US forces in Alaska and then the Aleutians cost the Japanese not only the men and money lost in the campaign, but tens of thousands of troops that were subsequently deployed to Northern Hokkaido to deter against an American invasion from the North. Ironically, the Americans only finally saw Alaska as vital to national security when it was taken from them.
After Midway, the Japanese no longer had the capacity to push further into Alaska or launch strategically useful operations against the American mainland. By the fall of 1942, the Japanese occupation of the Aleutian Islands had become a drawn out and hopeless effort to deny the Americans use of the islands. Weigh down thousands of US troops it did, but alter the strategic picture it did not. However, to consider the operation complete folly would be inaccurate. Had the Japanese succeeded at Midway, the foothold gained at Attu and Kiska would no doubt had provided the Japanese more security to the North and a staging area for follow on operations against US forces in Alaska. The operation failed because Midway failed. Once the IJN fleet was decimated, the appetite and capacity for further operations to the north disappeared.
Whether the Aleutian Islands Campaign may have been a diversion or a main effort by the Japanese in WWII, a future conflict between the US and China would not feature such a question. The arctic is undoubtedly a priority for Beijing. Controlling a strategic entry point into the Pacific and Arctic Oceans while denying the US access, will likely be an early objective for the PLA if a major conflict broke out between the two powers. Not only do the Aleutian Islands guard the Pacific’s northern door, they act as a control for cross-Arctic transit that with every year grows more lucrative. In addition, while the US’ Pacific possessions to the South may hold strategic value, they do not hold much in the way of critical resources. Alaska, in particular the Bering Strait’s fisheries and the North Slope’s hydrocarbons, are incredibly lucrative and are resources that are desperately needed to sustain the Chinese war machine and economy. Much like the Imperial Japanese, the Chinese face a deficit of strategic resources. China consumes more fish than any other nation on earth by more than 500,000 tons yearly and is the world’s largest importer of oil.
As Gen Mitchell told Congress in 1935, “”I believe that in the future, whoever holds Alaska will hold the world. I think it is the most important strategic place in the world.” In the broader Pacific region, there are three key control points: Singapore and the Strait of Malacca, Hawaii, and the Aleutian Islands/the Bering Sea. To control all 3 points is to dictate maneuver in and around the Pacific. Presently, all three points fall under the control of the US and its allies, but that is not a guarantee as China rises in influence and power. Moreover, controlling these points during a crisis becomes politically delicate as the trade of all nations is impacted. More than 40% of the world’s trade, and 85% of China’s, flows through the Strait of Malacca alone, and managing that access could cost friends and allies during a Sino-American conflict as nations prioritize their wallets during what would without a doubt be a simultaneous economic crisis as the world’s two largest economies fought each other. Both the US and China need open access to the Pacific to sustain their economies as well as military operations in the event of war. The more gates/chokepoints that one power controls, the more flexibility they have in planning and executing operations. Until recently, the Arctic passage was largely irrelevant but as the world has warmed and countries are learning how to exploit the opening of the Arctic trade routes, the Northern gateway to the Pacific has quietly grown in strategic relevance.
Just as we planned for the Imperial Japanese threat a century ago, we are prioritizing the warmer Pacific regions in war planning for a US-China conflict. This is not to say that those regions should not be prioritized, but that the Arctic region’s relevance holds a bigger slice of the strategic pie than it did nearly a century ago. We do not think of China as an Arctic nation, but Beijing claims itself as a “near-Arctic” nation and has long pushed for greater involvement and inclusion in a region to which it has no geographic or historic connection.
I do not mean to suggest the PLA’s most likely course of action is to seize US Arctic territory, but Hannibal did cross the Alps and MacArthur did land at Incheon. This is to say that while the conditions of Arctic operations may be harsh and difficult, they should not be discounted as an enemy course of action for that reason alone. Chinese civilian and military leadership have frequently and publicly discussed the importance of the Arctic to China’s view of the world and potential hegemony. Moreover, the US’ relatively weak presence in the Arctic presents opportunity for the bold and ambitious military planners of our revisionist rivals. As such, it would be intellectually dishonest and professional malpractice to dismiss such an operational threat simply because of difficulty and past performance without understanding how much conditions have shifted in favor of sustained combat operations in the Arctic regions.
An occupation of US arctic territory during a war would be a daring and risky maneuver, but there are several factors in favor of such an operation in 2020 and beyond that the Imperial Japanese did not have in 1942. Beijing continues to strengthen its strategic partnership with Russia which would enable more secure logistics, arctic warfare training and knowledge, and even additional troops to support an operation in the Bering Sea and greater Alaskan area of operations. The climate has also shifted in favor of the aggressor. While weather in the region is by no means temperate, it is improving. Less extreme winter weather and a longer fighting season that requires less cold weather gear and support systems enhances freedom and maneuver. Moreover, the shrinking ice caps provide an additional supply route during a conflict that would, for one reason or another, probably see the closure of the Panama Canal and Malacca Strait. Of the 3 major gateways to the Pacific, the Arctic passageway is the newest but perhaps the easiest to seize and hold open for a joint Sino-Russian force. In addition, in keeping with Beijing’s resource ambitions, the rich fisheries, hydrocarbon, and seafloor mineral deposits of the Bering Sea make it a prize to anyone who holds it. While the weather and harsh conditions certainly cannot be discounted, an operation cannot be discounted either in the face of such obstacles. The same mistake was made prior to 1942 and while the conditions were against the Japanese, our rivals today have much more in their favor.
EABO is a good start for shifting our operational level plans in the broader Pacific. The Marines’ Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations concept for adapting to and disrupting Chinese Pacific operations relies heavily on the lessons learned from WWII South Pacific battles while pairing them with the technology of today and tomorrow. The Marine Corps has done right in applying the lessons of amphibious operations and contested logistics from battles like Guadalcanal to planning for great power conflict. And given the growing influence of the CCP in the South Pacific, it makes sense to focus operational planning on the South Pacific’s environment. However, the Aleutian Islands campaign continues to be neglected as a case study in Pacific operations relative to how much the arctic has evolved and developed since WWII and how prominently it features in Chinese strategic objectives, even from Xi Jinping himself. So much has stayed the same since WWII but so much has changed as well. We are finally beginning to see the impact of the changing climate on combat operations and basing around the world, and that impact will only grow as the earth continues to warm and sea levels rise. New trade routes are opening up but the low-lying South Pacific islands may not be as operationally viable as waters rise and storms gather in strength. Therefore, understanding the lessons of the Aleutian Islands campaign and not repeating the planning failures of the 1930s is critical to maintaining control of the Pacific and containing an ambitious China that is growing ever more comfortable with being the aggressive power. Denying Beijing freedom of maneuver in the Northern Pacific limits their options, denies them a key logistics route to the rest of the world, keeps the PLA away from the US homeland, and protects our strategic resources in the High North.
Bridging the gap between the Marines EABO plans and the US Army’s plans for reviving coastal defense is necessary for joint force integration in Indo-Pacific operations. The Aleutian Islands are the best place to build interservice cooperation. The Aleutian Islands are the vital but weak link between the Marines’ Pacific mission and the Army’s broader homeland defense mission. Tying coastal defense systems in with Marine EABO missions will strengthen our joint force planning and capability for the wider Pacific region. Tying in EABO plans and modern coastal defense successfully would mean a minimized coverage gap in regional defense while maximizing coordinated fires against enemy targets. In addition, the Army’s air defense artillery (ADA) mission should be expanded in the Alaskan theatre to reinforce defense-in-depth of critical resources and chokepoints. Again, a forward presence in the Western part of the theatre does not need to be heavy so as to invite saber rattling with Russia. The US simply needs the ability to rapidly surge forces in the event of crisis.
Moreover, the development of the Arctic provides for better operational and logistical support from the mainland. This does not mean operating in sub-arctic or Arctic conditions is the same as a European summer, but it means that commanders have more options to decide where and how to act in the face of conditions that might have shut operations down 80 years ago. This is the hardest lesson to learn from the Aleutians campaign because it is the least tangible and can only be seen through trial and error. Just as prior to WWII, the US faces an uncertain defense budget with multiple contingencies to plan for and limited resources to compete.
In keeping with the USMC’s EABO plans for disrupting Chinese operations in the Western Pacific, our contingencies in the Alaskan theatre should run parallel. We should focus on the bulk of forces based in the mainland, ready to rapidly react to and disrupt enemy operations. Layers of early warning measures should be backed up with area denial weapons based on shore and off. This is a major technological evolution between the WWII campaign and potential future operations in the Aleutians. Coastal artillery can play a far greater role as a result of improved range, sensors, and the fact that transit through the Bering Strait is ever more important to global trade, making control of the gateway that much more critical. The Army can protect the coast without ever deploying en masse to its shores.
Before any of this can be operationalized, the US military should resurvey the Aleutian Islands and Alaskan coast for potential military use, particularly in the face of shifting weather patterns and sea levels. Melting permafrost may have a significant impact on the stability of old and new facilities alike and therefore on the ground surveys must be conducted in addition to aerial and orbital analysis. Upon completion of such surveys and assessments, the US military should identify locations for Anti-access/Area-denial (A2/AD) weapons system emplacement, permanent airfields, and FARP (Forward Arming and Refueling Point) sites. What I do not recommend is the permanent stationing of large troop numbers or aircraft in the Western Aleutians. Rather, the Aleutians should be treated as the Chinese treat their artificial islands in the SCS: as a site to surge forces in times of crisis to flex against our rivals and deter encroachment with a small permanent garrison focused on area denial. If the Bering Sea cannot be held open for US freedom of maneuver, then it must be denied to the enemy. As the arctic oil fields are a critical strategic resource, there must be a review and upgrade of US defensive posture and protective measures in the region. While it is unlikely that a Chinese or even Sino-Russian force would attempt an occupation of mainland Alaska, it is reasonable to conclude that oil fields, terminals, and ports would be targeted for destruction in order to disrupt the US war effort.
The Marines’ amphibious and expeditionary training makes them suited to operate here while the army works on the mainland. EABO should be expanded to include the North Pacific/Arctic so the joint force is better prepared to overcome the harsh conditions of operations in the theatre. Rapid basing and support systems designed for the South Pacific will have to be studied and modified for the rough, cold, and wet conditions. Rapid deployment of area denial and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets should be considered high priority in order to protect shipping and deny the arctic to Chinese vessels and deter Russian aggression. In this sense, we should mimic PLA deployment of similar assets to the SCS and focus first on establishing logistics and fortifications that can support a surge during crises. Ideally, we would follow the US’ first Aleutian campaign and stage most forces closer to the Alaskan mainland for better security and operational flexibility.
As the ground forces focus on area denial and operational disruption, the Navy and Air Force should increase presence and patrols in the region. The establishment of new FARP sites will greatly improve the reliability of air operations in a region where weather can shift rapidly and disrupt operations. In addition, the Navy should focus on ensuring US freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) while studying locations for possible mining operations to deny potential aggressor freedom of maneuver. In addition, new Coast Guard stations and icebreakers should be constructed to support Arctic transit operations in the event US naval forces must shift from the North Atlantic to the Pacific without use of the Panama Canal. The Navy should also research the reintroduction of seaplanes (manned or unmanned) to conduct ASW and reconnaissance patrol operations should airfields on the Aleutians be made untenable by natural or military means.
Finally, the military spaceport on Kodiak Island should be enlarged and reinforced in order to support antisatellite (ASAT) and tactical satellite (TACSAT) launches during wartime. It would be an excellent position for US Space Force to begin their pivot from support to combat operations. Support of scientific research satellites are more important to arctic operations than in any other climate. Shifting, intense weather patterns, rising sea levels, and melting ice caps mean that climate reconnaissance is strategic reconnaissance for Arctic operations. Protection and deployment of such systems in the High North should be a priority for the US Space Force.
In summary, it can be debated and will not be known in peacetime how closely the Russians and Chinese are willing to coordinate operations, if at all. Plans shift with intelligence and perceived intentions. Operationally, we should plan for the worst case scenario: a joint Sino-Russian operation in the event of the war in the Pacific that would seek, at minimum, to hold the Bering Sea gate open for Sino-Russian maneuver and trade while disrupting US oil extraction and refinement in Alaska. The Arctic grows commercially more valuable each year, and with that commercial value, its strategic value increases as well. The Arctic region is far more developed in 2020 than in 1942, and technology has evolved significantly for survivability in such harsh conditions. All-weather combat aircraft, durable and more powerful sensor technology, and improved navigational aids and charts provide for better planning and execution. It is easy to fall into the trap of relying on historical conditions when planning but the change in climate and sensors marks a significant shift in operational capabilities under extreme conditions. And unlike Europe or Asia, the Arctic has a barren history of combat operations. The US military does not have a plethora of campaigns to study in order to learn the Arctic battlefield. Our sole major campaign in the region was plagued by logistical and operational failures, as well as climatic extremes that cost thousands of lives. Good planning in peacetime can save blood in wartime and we must learn from the limited information we have on combat operations in the Arctic. The Alaskan theatre is critical to US dominance of the Pacific, more so now than ever. That importance will only grow as the Arctic continues to open up and more trade flows through its waters, turning the Bering Sea into a cold and harsh strategic chokepoint for global trade. If the US wants to maintain that gate to the Arctic-Pacific pathway, without costing itself so much blood and treasure, it must take the lessons from the Aleutian Islands campaign, pair them with the technologies and environmental conditions of today, and create a defense-in-depth plan for the Alaskan theater.
